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R

ussia’s rapid military victory over Georgia in August 2008 surprised
many commentators, since it stood in stark contrast to the manner in
which Russian forces had once become bogged down in a protracted conflict in Chechnya. On the other hand, the conflict might be thought of as
the final war of the twentieth century, fought by a Soviet legacy force, desperately seeking to make do with dated equipment and a top-heavy command and control system more suited to conducting the kind of large-scale
conventional warfare that had passed into the annals of military history.
Damage to Russia’s international reputation also ensued, jeopardizing the
nation’s relations with the European Union and NATO and raising questions regarding the legality of what Moscow dubbed a “peace enforcement
operation” that precipitated its unilateral recognition of the independence
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.1 Russia’s military actions provoked widespread international condemnation, spread panic among foreign investors,
and left the East European and Baltic members of NATO calling for protection from a “resurgent Russia.” In the following analysis, the lessons
learned by the Russian military will be examined in the context of an announced military reform and rearmament program aimed at producing a
more efficient, combat-capable conventional force by 2020. Despite the
rapid victory, the war itself exposed fundamental weaknesses and shortcomings in Russia’s armed forces, reinforcing conditions that were already
known and served as a catalyst for the military reform program.
Before proceeding to the lessons learned from the campaign, there
needs to be an important precursor: a brief explanation of what worked
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and how the otherwise beleaguered Russian military managed to deliver
swift success. Within a few hours of the commencement of the operation
the 76th (Pskov) Airborne Division’s 104th Regiment was already in action
in the Tskhinvali suburbs with 1,550 soldiers and more than 100 vehicles,
accompanied by no fewer than 200 men from the Pechora GRU brigade
Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye (Main Intelligence Directorate of
the General Staff). Russian mobility was arguably far superior to that seen in
previous conflicts. Within 24 hours the deployed forces almost doubled in size
even though Russia could not begin an immediate airlift, owing to Georgian
air defenses, and the army columns’ slow movement toward Tskhinvali via
the Rokki Tunnel forced commanders to commit troops piecemeal.2
A key factor in the speed of the Russian military victory was the
opening of a second front in Abkhazia using mechanized infantry. In South
Ossetia, Russian forces captured Tskhinvali and then crossed into undisputed
Georgian territory to effectively cut the main highway and railway routes
west of Gori. At least 2,000 soldiers occupied Zugdidi, a Georgian town
ten kilometers from the border, and an armored column continued another
30 kilometers to Senaki, capturing a military base and airfield, severing the
main highway and railway at a second location, enabling de facto Russian
military control of all heavy traffic movement across Georgia. Abkhaz
separatists subdued Georgian positions in the Kodori Valley, while Russia’s
Air Force (Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily—VVS) destroyed military facilities
in Tbilisi and Poti.3
In the final phase of combat operations the Russian Army made
efficient use of the Uragan multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS), TochkaU missiles, and also, possibly, the Smerch MLRS for attacks against the
Georgian Army’s positions. Those systems, coupled with support from the
Russian Air Force, inflicted sufficient losses on Georgian forces to bring
about their rapid “demoralization and retreat.”4 After hostilities ended,
the General Staff particularly praised the 76th Pskov airborne personnel
operating in South Ossetia and called attention to the need to strengthen air
assault battalions and possibly give the airborne units their own aviation
assets.5 Indeed, to fully equip, transport, and coordinate the deployment and
integration of these forces into combat operations alongside 58th Army units
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represented a notable demonstration not only of long-range airlift capability
encompassing more than 100 sorties, but also improved command and staff
arrangements, aspects that often challenged Russia’s Army in the 1990s.6
Arguably the rapid collapse of the Georgian armed forces, however,
was more a result of Georgian military weakness, poor management, and
limited combat capabilities, than anything accurately reflecting the prowess
of Russia’s armed forces.7 The Russian government struggled to mitigate the
political and economic consequences of the conflict, including criticism from
various international quarters regarding how closely it complied with the
ceasefire negotiated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and its decision to
unilaterally recognize the breakaway Georgian territories of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and confirming plans to establish Russian military bases there.
The damage to Russia’s international reputation was more painfully revealed
in the outflow of capital from foreign investors. Amidst a buoyant mood
in the Russian military, celebrating victory over Georgia and achievement
of the operational goals set by the Kremlin, an atmosphere of uncertainty
concerning the future of Russia’s conventional armed forces soon arose.
Georgia War: A Seismic Shock
The retrospective critique of Russia’s armed forces that publicly
unfolded in the autumn of 2008 was centered on key aspects of the military’s
combat capabilities.8 A recognizable pattern emerged which focused on
aged vehicles, hardware, and weaponry; ineffective command and control
organizations and systems; lack of interservice coordination; failures of
intelligence support and the GLONASS (Global’naya Navigatsionnaya
Sputnikovaya Sistema, or Global Navigation Satellite System); and an unusual
fascination with the causes of Russian casualties, distinct from previous
military operations. It should be noted that very little difference can be found
between the criticism of the campaign in either civilian media or official
sources,9 suggesting the presence of an orchestrated effort by the government
to “sell” reform to the military and garner support among the populace.10
Typical of this effort was the publicity when Lieutenant-General
Vladimir Shamanov, Chief of the Main Combat Training and Service
Directorate, said military training programs would be revised. “Training
programs for services and service arms are being reassessed with due account
taken of the specifics of the operation to rebuff the Georgian aggression
against South Ossetia, and of the experience gained in Chechnya. We are
also bearing in mind the Soviet Army’s experience in Afghanistan, the
United States’ operations in Iraq, and other armed conflicts.” Shamanov’s
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analysis of the weak performance of the Russian military in Georgia
encompassed three factors: poor interoperability between the Air Force and
ground units, communication problems during combat, and low-resolution
reconnaissance systems.11
Senior Russian officials called for armaments modernization,
military reorganization, increased defense spending, and switching from a
divisional to a brigade-based structure among permanent readiness units
as the key features of military reform.12 On 11 September 2008, President
Dmitry Medvedev stated, “We must focus on the modernization of our
armaments. The Caucasian crisis, the Georgian aggression, and ongoing
militarization make this task a top priority of our state.” Medvedev met
senior Russian officers at the Dongus test ground on 26 September and
demanded a “precise plan of action for the immediate future” by December
2008. He highlighted five areas for improvement:
status.

• Bring all combat formations and troop units to permanent readiness

• Raise the effectiveness of command and control systems.
• Improve the system of officer training, education, and military
science.
• Equip the armed forces with “the most modern weapons” with
special attention given to precision munitions.
• Improve the military’s pay, housing, and social amenities.13
Deep cuts among the officer corps and downsizing the armed forces,
as well as reforming the command and control structures, were always going
to be sources of heated controversy within the military, and the leadership
quickly moved to address the backlash.14 In November 2008, Army-General
Nikolay Makarov, Chief of the General Staff, justified the planned systemic
changes in terms of the experience gained in several campaigns:
Two command chains will be eliminated: regiments and divisions as far as
recent events (two Chechen campaigns and the August Caucasus conflict)
have demonstrated that our command system, created in the 1960s—army,
division, regiment, and battalion—is so complex and heavy that at the present
time we are unable to ensure quick decisionmaking, that orders reach troops,
interoperability, and effective command.15

General Makarov, whose prominent role in the military reform
campaign seemed intended to deflect criticism away from Defense Minister
Anatoliy Serdyukov, addressed a meeting of the Russian Academy of
Military Sciences in Moscow on 16 December. He highlighted the immense
operational and planning problems and low levels of combat readiness that
were prevalent during the war in Georgia. In short, Makarov suggested
68
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that Russian forces were incapable of fighting a modern war and had to be
radically reformed. “To find a lieutenant colonel, colonel, or general able
to lead troops with a sure hand, you had to chase down officers one by one
throughout the armed forces, because those career commanders in charge of
‘paper regiments and divisions’ just could not resolve the tasks set.” Once
officers were allocated personnel and equipment they soon demonstrated
their ineffectiveness by “losing their heads” or in some cases refusing to
fulfill assignments. Eighty-three percent of Army units were numerically
incomplete, and only 17 percent were combat ready. Of the 150 regiments in
the Air Force only five are permanently combat ready, while in the Navy “half
the warships stand idle at anchor,” Makarov lamented. He said Russia plans
to modernize 30 percent of its weapon systems by 2012, and 70 percent by
2020, and said that while conventional forces remain in such poor condition
Russia will place greater reliance on its strategic nuclear capabilities.16 His
speech marked him as perhaps the most severe critic of the contemporary
Russian armed forces and as the primary proponent of reform.
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I)
Russia’s central military command was evidently caught unaware by
the sudden crisis in South Ossetia; it occurred at a time when many officers
were on leave and civilian and military decisionmakers were unavailable.
In apparent disarray and panic, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
attempted to recall from retirement Colonel-General Alexandr Rukshin, the
former chief of the MoD’s Main Operations Directorate (critical in planning
and overseeing combat operations), but he refused the request to return to
duty. He had, in fact, been “retired” from his post in June 2008 by Defense
Minister Serdyukov following a dispute over proposed cuts to the officer
corps. Only a personal telephone call from Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
to the reluctant Rukshin overcame the latter’s refusal. As events unfolded,
Defense Minister Serdyukov, who was also difficult to contact in the early
hours of the crisis, failed to authorize the use of unmanned aerial vehicles
or an information warfare campaign; these missteps later provided grist
for officer complaints regarding the inexperienced “civilian” minister.17
Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, president of the Academy of Geopolitical
Problems, publicly criticized an earlier plan by President Medvedev that
had called for discharging up to 200,000 officers. General Ivashov disputed
that streamlining the General Staff would necessarily improve the combat
capabilities of the Russian Army. Moreover, he went out of his way to note
the General Staff’s disorganization at the initiation of hostilities in Georgia:
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Take 8 August, for example, when the Georgian Army attacked our
peacekeeping battalion in South Ossetia. For two to three days command and
control on the part of the General Staff was essentially absent. Why? First, the
chief of the General Staff was new, and his right hand, the chief of the Main
Directorate for Operations [General Rukshin] of the General Staff, had been
dismissed and no replacement had been found.18 On 8 August, the General
Staff was in the process of moving to a new location. The officers and generals
were loading their property, maps, and documents onto KamAZ trucks and
essentially did not control the situation.19

Communication systems and electronic warfare assets employed by
commanders and frontline forces were obsolete, in many cases “unchanged
since Soviet times.” The 58th Army commander, Lieutenant-General
Anatoliy Khrulev, was reported to have communicated with his forces in
the midst of combat via a satellite phone borrowed from a journalist, since
communication between units was unavailable.20 Intelligence failures were
quite evident, as demonstrated by the inability of units to communicate
space-based and electronic intelligence, which consequently “failed to
inform the country’s leadership of the concentration of Georgian troops.”
Additionally, such failures resulted in electronic warfare systems not being
employed to suppress Georgia’s air defenses. Commanders were forced to
struggle in their efforts to gain timely information related to events on the
battlefield; difficulties compounded by the fact that maritime and topographic
maps provided conflicting data.21 Satellite-targeting support to artillery was
woefully absent, thereby preventing the use of precision-guided munitions
and the accurate adjustment of artillery fire. Despite promises made in
December 2007 by Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov to fully equip the
Russian Army with GLONASS receivers by mid-2008, the Russian Army
largely went into combat in August with World War II-era compasses and
maps. Russian forces allegedly attempted to use the US Global Positioning
System (GPS), but were thwarted in their attempts by the fact that the map
of Georgia was blanked out for 48 hours. They were forced to resort to
targeting conventional weapon systems through the use of vintage 1960s
optical equipment.22
This lack of satellite data partly explains one issue that puzzled
military experts, the failure to employ precision-guided munitions. Munitions
such as the Kh-555 air-launched cruise missile, Gran shells and mines with
satellite guidance, or frontal aviation’s Kh-28 and Kh-58U antiradar missiles
were not deployed in theater.
In fact, the calamitous performance of Russia’s C3I during combat
operations in Georgia sheds some light on the rapid decision by Russian
authorities to seek increased funding to address these weaknesses. In
70
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September 2008, Prime Minister Putin announced a government decree
increasing the funding for the GLONASS program by some 67 billion rubles.
Aleksey Pchelintsev of the GLONASS/GNSS-Forum Association said
that “the system will guarantee round-the-clock navigation of the Russian
territory,” once a total of 17 satellites were in orbit. Three more satellites
were hurriedly scheduled for the GLONASS constellation in December
2008.23 GLONASS has both military and economic implications for Russia.
It will almost certainly prove to be a future force multiplier for the Russian
military, providing independent navigation and targeting for joint direct
attack munitions. It has the added value of potentially boosting the sale of
Russian military equipment abroad to customers who cannot rely on the
GPS. Ground forces commander-in-chief General Vladimir Boldyrev said
C3I capabilities would be upgraded. “In addition to updating the armament
of armored vehicles, [we] will take the most radical measures to update the
communication equipment of the tank troops and drastically improve their
command and control system.”
The Russian casualty rate was also disproportionately high and may
have reflected shortfalls of identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) equipment.
Obsolete equipment in many cases rendered the units “blind and deaf” and
may have been a contributory factor in losses from friendly fire. General
Shamanov indicated that the Georgian conflict had forced the MoD to
compile a list of critical equipment required for any future operation. This
compilation emphasized the priority of geopositioning and IFF equipment.
Shamanov said, “In South Ossetia the IFF system in fact did not work, and
it was very hard for our units to recognize whose equipment they were
seeing—ours or Georgian.”24
Aging Equipment
The deteriorating condition of Russian weapons and vehicles has
long been a source of discontent within the military, with insufficient
funds allocated to modernize obsolete hardware and equipment. Civilian
commentators and media repeatedly highlighted this factor following the
Georgian war. Officers who participated in the campaign told President
Medvedev that the quality of their equipment fell seriously short of that
which the United States had supplied to the Georgian Army.25
A remarkable feature of the Russian media reporting was the extent
to which harsh criticism was directed at equipment still in use by Russian
forces. Rossiyskaya Gazeta reported that reactive armor canisters mounted
on the 58th Army’s T-72 tanks were empty, effectively rendering them
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useless. Reportedly the 58th Army’s command vehicles were falling apart.
“The headquarters UAZ [Russian all-terrain vehicle] didn’t want to start
at all.” Commanders apparently “submissively stood and waited while
the repairmen brought the vehicle back to life. After the UAZ started up
and was [being] driven out the gate its silencer fell off after 50 meters.”
According to eyewitnesses, the unit’s two armored columns (150 to 170
pieces of equipment), designated to spearhead the advance into Tskhinvali,
left broken-down vehicles along the Zarskaya road.26
The independent Russian military weekly, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye
Obozreniye (NVO), pointed out that 60 to 75 percent of 58th Army’s tanks
deployed to the theater of operations were older T-62 and T-72Ms. Even
the upgraded T-72BM could not withstand Georgian antitank warheads.
Older tanks not only lacked GPS but also thermal imagers and IFF systems.
Moreover, the armored columns included BMP-1 and BMD-1 (infantry
personnel carriers) with “primitive” sights and vision equipment.27
Airpower: Future Lessons?
Russia’s use of airpower in the campaign undoubtedly played a major
role in securing the military’s operational goals. Yet, as the media and officials
developed their criticism of Russia’s conventional forces, they extended
their criticism to include the Air Force.28 The root cause of this negativity
stemmed from the downing of a Tu-22M3 strategic bomber by Georgia’s air
defenses. The bomber was shot down while flying a reconnaissance mission,
an event that was singled out by the media as intolerable. It is remarkable
that the VVS conducted no suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)
operations; however, this may have been a reflection of the lack of nightfighting capability. On the eve of the campaign the VVS had no around-theclock SEAD capabilities, which meant Russia did not possess the option
of mounting an air campaign such as those executed by the United States
in the 1991 Gulf War, Afghanistan in 2001, or Iraq in 2003. Retired VVS
commanders Army-General Petr Deynekin and Army-General Anatoliy
Kornukov harshly criticized the failure to suppress Georgia’s air defenses.
General Kornukov was especially damning, saying the Tu-22 “was sent
to its death,” and he raged at “the miscalculations of intelligence and the
incompetence of the Air Force leadership.” General Deynekin added that
the “poorly organized” search-and-rescue service contributed to the capture
of Russian pilots.29 Other critics attacked the absence of a unified command
system as a cause of aircraft losses. Retired General Makhmut Gareyev
argued that army aviation’s failure to provide effective close air support to
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ground combat units was a result of its subordination to the VVS. General
Gareyev called for the return of tactical aviation to ground commanders and
the placement of forward air controllers in each ground force battalion.30
There was also confusion surrounding the nature of the command
relationship between the North Caucasus Military District commander and
the VVS. The VVS operations were being directed by VVS commanderin-chief Colonel-General Aleksandr Zelin, who commanded the air forces
from his office on his mobile phone, without entering the command post.
He decided all matters related to the conduct of air operations and did not
even consider it necessary to invite his air defense assistants to a meeting.
Furthermore, the VVS was accused of failing to support ground combat
operations. NVO asserted that a lack of air controllers among Russian troops
was responsible for allowing Georgian multiple-rocket launchers to fire on
Tskhinvali for 14 hours without opposition. Allegedly, the Air Force was
unable to integrate two- or three-man observer teams with the combinedarms units without deploying a command post “in parallel,” a fact that left
Russian armored columns without sufficient resources to coordinate air
cover. When Russian military planning staffs assessed the role of airpower
in the Georgia war, they concluded that Russian aviation losses would have
been significantly higher if Georgia’s air defenses been considerably more
efficient.31 Equally, had the Georgian Army not panicked and abandoned
several Buk-M1 surface-to-air missile launchers close to Senaki, in western
Georgia, and a small number of Osa missile launchers in South Ossetia,
they could have inflicted much greater losses on Russian aircraft. General
Rukshin finally intervened to order attacks on Georgian air defenses, an act
that arguably should have been executed much earlier in the campaign.32
The Navy’s Role?
It is notable that there was an absence of media hostility toward the
role and operational functions of the Russian Navy during the Georgia war.
The Black Sea Fleet, among the most combat capable in the Russian Navy,
was used to blockade the Georgian coastline. Abkhaz authorities claimed
that Russian ships had thwarted a Georgian attempt to seal the coastline of
Abkhazia. Russian media reported that the Moskva, a Slava-class cruiser,
and the Smetlivy, a Kashin-class destroyer, along with a number of small
supply and logistics vessels, sailed from Sevastopol, arriving in the region
on 10 August 2008 with the mission of providing “aid to refugees.” Their
precise involvement in the conflict is unclear, though the Russian Navy
did sink a Georgian patrol boat. But given the Russian Navy’s presence
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in the Black Sea in such close proximity to the area of operations, closer
examination of the timing of embarkation and the alert status of the Black
Sea Fleet might indicate an advanced level of military preparedness prior to
the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali.33
Military Reform
On 14 October 2008, Defense Minister Serdyukov announced a “new
stage” in military reform, promising the most radical change to the military
since 1945. Serdyukov said this reform would affect the entire functional
basis of Russia’s armed forces, transforming personnel numbers, central
command and control agencies, and the officer training system. Although
these plans were initiated prior to the war in the South Caucasus, he stated
that the events in Georgia had “strongly influenced” the character of the
reforms. The program involves the following elements:
• Reducing the armed forces to one million by 2012.
• Downsizing the General Staff by 200,000 officers.
• Converting from a “mobilization” to a “permanent readiness”
force structure by 2012.
• Introducing a three-tiered structure (military district, operational
command, and brigade) to improve command and control efficiency.
• Streamlining the military education system, resulting in a reduction
in the number of educational facilities.
• Reforming the airborne forces by distributing airborne brigades to
all six military districts.
• Updating equipment and weapon systems in stages with the aim of
achieving a modernized military by 2020.
Serdyukov explained that the overall aim of this reform is to create
a professional, permanent combat-ready force. All formations of Russia’s
Army will be fully manned and become permanent-readiness forces by 2012.
Recognizing the controversial nature of the reforms, Minister Serdyukov
expected a fierce reaction from the military. He made it abundantly clear
that the top-heavy troop management system, more suited to large-scale
conventional warfare, had to evolve. “From the point of view of positions,
our Army today is reminiscent of an egg which is swollen in the middle.
There are more colonels and lieutenant colonels than there are junior
officers. In three years we will build a pyramid, in which everything will be
precisely structured and tested.”34
If the reforms succeed, by 2020 a modernized Russian military
will encompass the new project-955 Borey-type submarine, armed with
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the Bulava sea-launched ballistic missile. Also, the modern, ground-based
Topol-M ballistic missiles will have replaced conventional Topols. Ground
forces will have modern tanks (the T-80 Chernyy Orel [Black Eagle]) and
air defense systems (the S-400 surface-to-air missile system). There will be
a fifth-generation Russian fighter; delivery of the state-of-the-art, multirole
Su-35 fighter is to begin in 2011. All units will be transferred to the category
of permanent combat-readiness units (at the moment the ratio of combat
organizations to general-readiness units is one to five). The system of higher
military education will be reformed. Social provisions for service members
will change; all officers will have housing, and pay will be the same as for
NATO forces.35
A vital element of this reform is budgeting to modernize dated or
aging equipment. President Medvedev has earmarked increased funding for
aviation equipment and precision-guided munitions. “As a result, budget
applications have been accepted from the militarized agencies amounting
to 344 billion rubles additionally,” Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov
reported to Medvedev.36 Indeed, by 2020 Russia anticipates that almost all
of its armed forces will be modernized. “In the next three to five years we
plan to equip 30 percent of the armed forces with advanced weapons and
military hardware, and to raise this figure to 80 to 100 percent by 20182020,” Army-General Makarov, Chief of the General Staff, said.37
Since personnel numbers are to be reduced, Russia’s Defense Ministry
will impose increased health requirements on applicants for entry to military
higher education, as well as on contract soldiers and conscripts. In addition,
approximately 70 percent of the billets of officers working in education
will be eliminated. “Out of roughly 17,500 military educators, about 5,000
will be left by the end of 2009,” according to a spokesman for the MoD.
“During the staff reorganization measures, the posts of officers engaged in
education at company [through] battalion level will be abolished, and over
8,000 junior officer posts—lieutenants and captains—will be cut.”38
In December 2008, Defense Minister Serdyukov told the Northern
Fleet in Severomorsk that “one of the major objectives of the reforms . . .
comes down to establishment of a combat-ready, mobile, and perfectly
equipped Army and Navy capable of simultaneous participation in at least
three regional and local conflicts.” This statement not only marked a departure
from Russia’s current military doctrine, which outlines one conflict and one
all-out war, but also raised questions regarding the definition of “regional
or local conflicts.” This new strategy may forecast changes in the military
doctrine planned for late 2009.39
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Of course, given the slow pace associated with the introduction of
modernized equipment and weaponry, it is worth noting that each new system
introduced will already be several years out of date. Similarly, despite the
ambitious and confident nature of the announced reforms, one of the most
evasive questions thus far is how modernization can be resourced in the
context of the global financial crisis and declining oil prices.
Reform and Controversy
Following Serdyukov’s speech on military reform, critics soon
marshalled not only to question the proposed reform program but in a number
of instances actually demanded the Defense Minister’s resignation. This sense
of outrage was partly rooted in the degree of reductions that would affect the
General Staff, yet it also reflected deep neuralgia within the military and
civilian circles. Critics claimed the reformed armed forces would undermine
centuries of tradition and leave the nation weak and vulnerable. Russian
television reported alarming statistics related to the officer reductions: By
2012 the numbers of colonels were to be slashed by two-thirds, majors by
three-quarters, and a total abolition of warrant officers.
Criticism of Minister Serdyukov was severe, drawing attention to
statements made following his appointment as Defense Minister in 2007
when he pronounced the armed forces “fit for purpose,” obviously failing to
notice their obsolete equipment or the homeless state of numerous officers.
He was accused of auctioning off military assets with little received in
return. Major-General Aleksandr Vladimirov presented an image of the
General Staff under attack, facing an “invasion of dozens of some sorts
of structures from Saint Petersburg.” A “new broom” approach intended
to sweep clean the General Staff was in Vladimirov’s view achieving very
little. His perplexity concerning the need for such controversial reforms
was perhaps due to the timing; after all, Russia had just won a war. He did
acknowledge that the call for radical change, such as the reorganization to
a brigade-based structure, with emphasis on a mobile permanent-readiness
force, was a direct result of weaknesses exposed during the conflict in
Georgia:
Our victorious five-day war with Georgia showed up the poor performance
of the General Staff, the poor performance by the command of the military
district, and the poor performance of the army command.40

The war had, in fact, compelled Serdyukov to reform the structure of
Russia’s conventional forces, exchanging the four-tiered construct (military
district, army, division, and regiment) for a new three-tiered system (military
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district, operational command, and brigade). The real question was the value
of forming a new mobile formation in such a large country, the thought
being that the new mobile force was best suited for operations within a
compact theater. “Russia is a vast land, so in many ways a brigade-based
system could turn out to be just useless,” noted one knowledgeable critic.41
It was also suggested that plans to reform the military education system by
streamlining the 65 existing military educational establishments into ten
“military-science centers” would effectively decimate Russia’s military
science hierarchy. The impact of this new organization on the overall defense
effort is at this time unknown, and could, in fact, be negligible. But the lack
of public debate regarding these changes is definitely cause for alarm, and
the tide of criticism against Serdyukov has grown in such proportion to
result in questioning the “sense” of having a civilian as Defense Minister.
Communists within the Duma publicly demanded Serdyukov’s
resignation, accusing him of instigating reforms that jeopardized national
security and amounted to a “pogrom” of the officer corps. Again, the
extensive nature of the planned cuts was the main source of controversy.
Nevertheless, the Communist members of the Duma were astute enough
to recognize that some type of reform was required. “The victory over the
tiny Georgian Army should not give our leadership and society illusions of
grandeur. This short war uncovered a mass of flaws in troop command and
combat readiness,” declared the Communist deputies.42
A statement by officers, a number of military-patriotic groups,
and veterans’ organizations followed this same line of criticism. It was
signed by such notables as Colonel-General Leonid G. Ivashov, president
of the Academy for Geopolitical Problems; Colonel-General Vladislav
A. Achalov, head of the Union of Russian Airborne Troops; and ArmyGeneral Igor N. Rodionov, former Minister of Defense. The statement
characterized elements of the reform program: “They are cynical in nature
and may lead to the complete destruction of the personnel training system,
re-orientation of doctrinal concepts, and will undermine the most important
foundations of the development of the Russian Armed Forces.” The critical
statement also argued that the reductions of military command agencies
were ill-conceived and “alarming,” since those organizations were tasked
with staffing formations and unit structures. Restructuring the military to a
brigade-based system was portrayed as trying to copy the American model,
which for a number of these military specialists was the ultimate insult;
even though Russia began experimenting with brigade constructs before the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. The veterans’ critique differed, however, on
one crucial point, the linking of reforms to the Georgia war: “Considering
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the extremely radical nature of the reforms, it is especially senseless to base
it on the experience of the complex five-day war in the Caucasus in August
2008.” The self-styled “military-patriotic community” in Russia considered
any linking of the reform program to the Georgia war to be overstated.43
Recalibrating and the Future
It is unusual, to say the least, that what was considered in many
circles a successful war should be the catalyst for military reform. Yet,
given the controversy that swept Russia following the announcement of
this ambitious reform program, the political and military elites in Moscow
chose to link reform with the Georgian conflict. The leadership was perhaps
driven by a conviction that reform could best be accomplished within the
context of a successful military campaign. Allowing for the politicization
of various critiques of this new operational assessment, some degree of
exaggeration is likely due to parties competing for their own interests during
the implementation phase of the reform program. It is clear, however, that
“something” has changed within the power circles with regard to military
reform. That “something” relates to how the country’s leadership transitioned
from the conduct of a successful war to announcing sweeping reforms of
the armed forces. The reforms entail a move away from a mobilization
army to one of permanent formations, with an emphasis on mobility and
modernization.
It is this author’s contention that the Russian military and political
leadership came to perceive the Georgian war as a setback to their aspirations
of projecting the image of a “resurgent Russia.” This negative assessment
of Russia’s conventional armed forces in the conflict sent a seismic shock
throughout the security establishment. The reform program has the support
of President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin. This critical fact, when
coupled with the December 2008 amendment to the Russian constitution
that extended the presidential term to six years, is grounds to cause one to
believe that systemic military reform will be implemented; it remains to be
seen how enthusiastically and successfully such reform will be executed.
One final point: Russia’s armed forces will not be reformed along “western”
lines; even the term has pejorative connotations within political circles. The
military may emerge, however, as a force better suited to the needs of a
modern and possibly resurgent Russia.
The Georgian war was arguably the last war of the twentieth
century for Russia’s armed forces; in the sense that it was largely fought
using organizations, tactics, and equipment designed in the last century.
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Shortly after President Medvedev’s inauguration, Moscow was the
scene of the largest military parade since the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in 1991. It was a grand display of national pride and promoted
the image of preeminent military power.44 Within three months that
same military was exposed as far from preeminent. Medvedev and
Putin appear serious about closing the gap between image and reality
with regard to Russia’s armed forces. This will not be an easy task, as
succinctly captured in the words of a Russian soldier who fought during the
Georgia campaign: “The equipment is for parades, but unfit for battle.”45
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